As Israel and the United States continue coordinated military strikes on targets across Iran, and Tehran retaliates against sites in Dubai, Doha, Bahrain, and Kuwait, locations hosting US military facilities or allied to Washington, the conflict is reverberating far beyond the immediate exchange of fire.

Explosions and smoke have been reported in Tehran and other cities, while Iranian state media say at least 53 people were killed at a girls’ school amid the violence. Alongside the external confrontation, a more complex question is emerging: how will renewed war pressure affect Iran’s fragile internal balance, particularly in long-restive provinces such as Sistan-Baluchestan?

For decades, the south-eastern province bordering Pakistan and Afghanistan has been the scene of a violent low-level insurgency, with elements of Iran’s ethnic Baloch minority demanding greater rights, autonomy, and an end to what they describe as systemic discrimination.

A moment seen as “historic” by Baloch political circles

Since the strikes began, the People’s Resistance Front, a coalition active in eastern Sistan-Baluchestan, has circulated more than 10 videos on its social media channels showing thick plumes of smoke rising from military installations and airbases in the province. The group presents the footage as evidence that the state’s grip on security is weakening.

The group’s messaging frames the external attacks as a turning point. Its leaders say the Iranian system, in power for 47 years, has not only suppressed Baloch political and cultural expression but has also imposed harsh measures on other minorities, including Kurds, Arabs, Turkmen, and, increasingly, Persian opposition voices.

They describe long-standing grievances: mosques and homes allegedly destroyed, cultural rights restricted, young Baloch men persecuted or executed, and deep economic marginalisation in one of Iran’s poorest regions. Many Iranian Baloch view the current escalation as an opportunity to push collectively for change.

However, most opposition voices stress that they are not advocating separation from Iran. Instead, they say their aim is full autonomy within the country, alongside dignity, equal treatment, and recognition of their identity. The present moment, in their view, should be used to unite with others seeking reform or systemic change rather than fragment the state along ethnic lines.

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What is the People’s Resistance Front?

The political and militant landscape in Sistan-Baluchestan has long been fragmented. In December 2025, the Sunni militant group Jaish al-Adl announced it had joined several smaller Baloch paramilitary organisations to form a new coalition targeting Iran’s clerical establishment. The alliance, often referred to as the Popular Fighters Front or People’s Resistance Front (Jabheh-yi Mubarizin-i Mardumi), signalled an attempt to consolidate disparate armed factions under a single banner.

Supporters say unity strengthens their political leverage and their ability to coordinate messaging during a national crisis. Critics, however, argue that the involvement of armed groups risks further militarising an already volatile province and complicating any broader reform movement.

The Baloch and the Kurds have historically been among the most persistent centres of resistance within Iran. While some voices have called for complete independence, others advocate a federal model or expanded regional autonomy. What unites them is a perception of long-standing exclusion from political power and economic development.

The risks of internal breakdown and regional impact

Despite widespread dissatisfaction in parts of the country with Iran’s current regime, central authorities have maintained strong control over key state functions, particularly border security. Iran sits astride critical narcotics trafficking corridors stretching from Afghanistan through Iran and Turkey into Europe. Another major route runs via maritime channels along the Gulf of Oman and the Makran coast.

A serious internal security breakdown in Iran could have consequences well beyond Iran’s borders. A weakened Iranian state might create openings for narcotics networks to expand operations along established land and sea routes, affecting regional and European security.

There are also concerns about cross-border militancy. Iran’s Sistan-Baluchestan province shares a long, porous frontier with Pakistan’s Balochistan province, where a separate insurgency has simmered for years. Escalating instability on the Iranian side could embolden militant groups, facilitate arms flows, or encourage fighters to move across the border. That, in turn, could strain already delicate relations between Tehran and Islamabad, and risk drawing Pakistan into a cycle of retaliatory security operations. Any sustained breakdown could also complicate counter-terrorism coordination between the two countries.

Jihadist threat

There is also concern about jihadist threats. The Islamic State (IS) has long viewed Iran as an enemy and has carried out deadly attacks inside the country, including twin bombings in Kerman in January 2024 that killed nearly 100 people. A distracted or fragmented state apparatus could provide space for extremist networks such as IS to regroup. Any resurgence could pose broader risks to Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Turkey.

Between opportunity and uncertainty

For many opposition voices in Iran, the current escalation is being cast as a rare political opening after decades of marginalisation. For Iran’s ethnic minorities, if change comes, they argue it must deliver rights and autonomy within a reimagined Iranian framework, not simply replace one form of centralised power with another.

There are also fears. External military pressure may weaken Tehran’s authority, but it could also trigger harsher crackdowns in peripheral provinces, deepen instability, and empower non-state actors such as jihadists, drug traffickers, human traffickers, smugglers, and criminal gangs whose agendas diverge sharply from those of non-violent activists seeking reforms in Iran.

As missiles and drones dominate headlines, Iran’s internal fault lines are once again exposed. Whether the crisis leads to reform, fragmentation, or renewed repression may depend not only on events in the skies above Tehran but also on how regions such as Sistan-Baluchestan navigate what many there already describe as a historic moment.

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Fighting between the ethnic Baloch armed group, the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA), and Pakistani security forces, which began on Saturday in the country’s south-western province of Balochistan, was still continuing on Monday afternoon, according to multiple reports.

Reports say fierce clashes continued in the eastern districts of Nushki and Washuk until Monday, areas bordering both Afghanistan and Iran. Balochistan violence has taken an alarming turn, with several female suicide bombers, aged between 24 and 60, participating in the fighting. The BLA has released pictures of women bombers as young as 24 and as old as 60. Such involvement of women must raise serious concerns for a state about what is motivating both young and elderly women to join a violent insurgency. This should also concern a state when Baloch insurgents were roaming the cities and towns, people were seen hugging them, kissing their foreheads, and one video circulated showing women praying for them, saying, “Allah help you, Allah protect you, Koran protect you, and may you see a free Balochistan while alive.”

Such scenes should force a state to think about why the local population has started viewing Baloch insurgents as national guardians, while the army and security personnel are increasingly seen as enemies. If the state responds with more force and repression to such scenes, violence will escalate, and more of the public may move to support insurgents. It is time for the state to undergo a fundamental reassessment of its Balochistan policies.

What is Fuelling the Insugency

Overall, the situation in Balochistan has been dramatically deteriorating since 2018. That year’s general elections were regarded by many observers as deeply manipulated, with a new political party, the Balochistan Awami Party (BAP), emerging almost overnight and being brought into power. The party lacked popular legitimacy and public support. Corruption increased significantly, while few practical measures were taken to address widespread poverty. Governance in the province dramatically worsened, and the door to engagement, reconciliation, and dialogue with disgruntled Baloch leaders closed. The state also did not take any economic measures to alleviate poverty, improve the lives of ordinary people, or create better economic opportunities for them, relying instead on security to contain an insurgency that rose its head in 1948.

Young people, already disappointed, frustrated, and resentful towards the state, increasingly saw armed groups as a saviour.

Public anger had already been high over the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), which many locals feel failed not only to deliver economic benefits but also to bring greater militarisation and hardship. In Gwadar, residents who had long depended on fishing and informal cross-border trade with Iran for their livelihoods saw both activities curtailed by security measures linked to CPEC, a $62 billion investment in Pakistan and the flagship project of its Belt and Road Initiative. Promised economic alternatives and the transformation of Gwadar, the CPEC gateway to Dubai or Singapore, did not materialise, further deepening resentment.

As CPEC came to be viewed by many as exploitation, a new development in March 2022 added to local concerns. Canadian-based giant mining firm Barrick Gold Corporation signed a landmark agreement with Pakistan’s federal government and the Balochistan provincial government to revive the massive Reko Diq copper and gold project, ending a long-running legal dispute. Under the deal, Barrick was granted a 50% stake, with the remaining 50% divided between Balochistan and federal entities.

For many in the province, this backed the perception that Balochistan’s natural resources were being extracted without the consent of the local population and without meaningful benefit to ordinary people.

Balochistan’s Artificial Leadership a Stumbling Block Between Islamabad and Local Baloch

For years, a segment of tribal chieftains, corrupt politicians, and elites within Balochistan have been accused of exploiting local suffering and misrepresenting Balochistan’s realities to Islamabad and Punjab.

A major issue between the federal capital, Punjab, where many key decisions are made, and Balochistan has been a persistent communication gap. Critics argue that the military, bureaucracy, and political leadership in Punjab have little understanding of Balochistan’s social and political dynamics, and Balochistan’s artificial leadership is further deepening this divide.

Mainstream political parties have a minimal presence in the province, largely because they lack electoral capital there. Balochistan has a small population with only 16 seats in the National Assembly of Pakistan, which does not attract mainstream political parties. As a result, they invest little effort in understanding local concerns. On the other hand, Punjabi bureaucrats often have limited exposure to Balochistan, while ordinary Pakistanis in Punjab rarely encounter it through education, employment, or economic activity, as the province has no major industries that could offer jobs to Punjabis or good institutions and universities where students from Punjab could come to study. In Punjab and Islamabad, knowledge of Balochistan is limited to brief mentions in school textbooks that it is a mineral-rich province of Pakistan, or to their knowledge coming from the imposed artificial leadership of Balochistan, who use their wealth, contacts, and power to keep misleading people through the media.

This lack of understanding has shaped public perceptions in Islamabad and Punjab. With the rise in violence, much of Pakistan’s population now associates Balochistan primarily with insurgency, often accepting narratives that blame foreign involvement, particularly India. Even senior politicians have frequently echoed such claims.

Analysts argue that while a small group within Balochistan has long misled federal authorities, Islamabad itself failed to engage directly with locals and instead relied on local intermediaries. While territorial contiguity was a fundamental structural flaw that contributed to the eventual separation of Bangladesh, the lack of communication, language barriers, limited interest of Pakistan’s mainstream political parties in Balochistan, as it does not provide them a vote bank, along with the absence of good universities, industries, and cultural and social exchanges, which could attract people of Punjab to Balochistan, has created deep mistrust and a profound lack of understanding of Balochistan in Punjab and Islamabad. The result is a massive security crisis that has now escalated to unprecedented levels.

In recent clashes, reports have emerged of the state using drones in Nushki to target militants. Some local sources have alleged that drones may also have been used in civilian areas, though such claims remain contested.

Following Saturday’s violence, many analysts say it is time for Islamabad and Punjab’s leadership to recognise the true nature of the conflict and the depth of long-standing grievances in Balochistan, including issues of political marginalisation, unequal representation, and a deep sense of isolation among the Baloch population.

Responding to violence with further force has repeatedly failed. Over the past two decades, the state has largely relied on military solutions, yet the insurgency has grown more lethal and organised rather than weakened.

What is Next?

It is high time the state considers dialogue, reconciliation, and a comprehensive reassessment of Pakistan’s Balochistan policy.

As part of immediate confidence-building measures, Islamabad must immediately dismiss the current provincial government, form a national government, release civil rights activist Dr Mahrang Baloch and other members of the Baloch Yakjehti Committee (BYC), suspend existing policies related to Balochistan, call an all-party conference on Balochistan in Quetta, and hold genuinely free and fair elections as early as possible.

As fighting continues across parts of the province, the crisis in Balochistan appears to be entering a critical phase, one that may determine whether Pakistan pursues a political resolution or remains locked in a cycle of escalating conflict.

On Saturday morning, in an unprecedented wave of violence, the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA), which seeks an independent Balochistan, said it had launched coordinated attacks across twelve towns in the province.

Among the hardest hit was Quetta, the provincial capital, where armed men carrying automatic weapons were seen in several parts of the city. Militants attacked police positions, torched a bank, and set police vehicles on fire. Similar scenes were reported in Nushki, Mastung, Kalat, Kharan, and other towns, with footage circulating widely on social media.

Security forces said 67 militants had been killed as operations continued following what they described as foiled coordinated attacks at multiple locations. The BLA, however, claimed its fighters struck 48 different sites across 14 cities, killing 84 members of the security forces. These figures could not be independently verified.

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Where has violence been reported?

Local officials and government sources have so far reported unrest, clashes, and bombings in Quetta, Noshki, Mastung, Dalbandin, Kalat, Kharan, Panjgur, Gwadar, Pasni, Turbat, Tump, Buleda, Mangochar, Lasbela, Kech, and Awaran.

The full scale of the attacks remains unclear. However, suicide bombings and vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs) were reported in Quetta, Pasni, Gwadar, Noshki, and Dalbandin.

Casualty figures are still emerging, with strict information controls and internet shutdowns imposed across several cities as this report is being filed.

The BLA has described the latest violence as “Operation Herof, Phase 2.0”.

What is “Herof”?

Herof is a Balochi literary term meaning “black storm”, commonly used in Baloch poetry, including by the veteran poet Karim Dashti.

The BLA first launched Herof Phase One in August 2024, carrying out attacks across 12 districts in Balochistan.

During that phase, a female suicide bomber targeted a security forces camp in Lasbela district, about 125 kilometres from Karachi. Militants also killed 22 people in Musakhel, near the Punjab border, after forcing passengers out of vehicles and checking their identities.

Both Lasbela and Musakhel had traditionally been regarded as relatively peaceful areas.

What makes Herof II different from Phase I?

The current wave of attacks is broader in scope, more intense and more violent, with operations spread across a wider geographic area and involving a larger number of fighters.

For the first time, women are reported to be taking part in direct combat alongside male militants. Previously, female involvement had been limited to suicide attacks.

Several videos circulating online appear to show women participating in clashes with security forces.

An officer from Pakistan’s Intelligence Bureau in Quetta estimated that between 800 and 1,000 fighters, including a small number of women, may be involved in the coordinated attacks. The BLA has not confirmed those figures.

Another striking feature of this phase has been its media strategy. The BLA released footage showing its leader, Bashir Zaib, a former student who became a guerrilla commander, sitting on the back of a Japanese-made Honda 125 motorcycle.

His previous video appearance had been released by the group’s media wing, Hakkal, in June 2024.

In the latest footage, Zaib is seen with a beard and long hair, wearing a jacket and gloves, clothing that suggests the video was recorded recently, in line with current weather conditions.

Observers note that the image of Zaib riding a motorcycle may be a deliberate symbolic tactic. A similar image of Syria’s President, Ahmed al-Sharaa, also known as Abu Mohammed al-Jolani, went viral when he was seen sitting on the back of a motorbike before assuming power, a moment widely interpreted as a symbol of mobility, accessibility, and control of territory. The BLA video appears to mirror that symbolism.

Where was Zaib filmed, and why was this location chosen?

According to a Baloch traveller familiar with the region, the mountainous terrain, landscape, and a single cemented road seen in the video suggest it was filmed between Kharan and Chagai.

A senior Baloch journalist described the choice of location as strategic.

Dalbandin, in the wider Chagai region, is home to vast mineral resources, including the major Reko Diq and Saindak projects. There has been growing international interest in Reko Diq, with mining giant Barrick Gold pledging to invest around $7 billion in developing gold and copper deposits in two phases.

The Asian Development Bank is also expected to provide a $410 million financing package for the project, while the United States, Japan, and several European countries have shown interest in investment.

Analysts say Bashir Zaib’s appearance in this area sends a clear message to both the Pakistani government and foreign investors, underlining the BLA’s ability to operate in regions central to Pakistan’s economic ambitions.

Many Baloch have long opposed large-scale foreign investment in the province’s mineral sector, saying that local communities have not benefited.

Zaib’s presence in Balochistan also appears to counter the perception that he is based in Afghanistan, a point that may ease pressure on the Afghan Taliban from international actors.

Why has the BLA become stronger?

Analysts link the insurgency’s growing strength to political developments and security policies in Balochistan since 2018.

That year’s elections were widely criticised as heavily manipulated, leading to the installation of a government seen by many locals as disconnected from public needs and deeply involved in corruption.

Opportunities for political dialogue and engagement narrowed, while the province became increasingly militarised.

The Counter Terrorism Department (CTD) was granted expanded powers and has been accused by rights groups of enforced disappearances, extrajudicial killings, and dumping of bodies.

A major turning point came in August 2020, when a university student, Hayat Baloch, was shot dead by paramilitary Frontier Corps personnel in Kech district in front of his parents. The incident occurred a day before Pakistan’s Independence Day and sparked widespread outrage.

Later, a large Pakistani flag was erected in the area, which many locals saw as further inflaming tensions.

Public anger was already high following the killing of a young woman, Malik Naz, who was shot inside her home in May 2020 in what was described as an armed robbery by allegedly security forces-backed criminals.

The handling of Haq Do Tehreek protests, a civil rights movement originating in Gwadar, also deepened resentment in 2023. Following clashes between protesters and authorities, internet services were suspended for ten days in January 2023.

In November 2023, CTD killed a young man, Baalach Mula Baksh, in custody, labelling him a militant, a claim disputed by his family, triggering protests across the province.

Further demonstrations led by activist Dr Mahrang Baloch in Islamabad from December 2023 into early 2024 were met with crackdowns.

The February 2024 elections were again widely criticised as manipulated. The new government has been accused by critics of denying the existence of a Baloch problem, relying on media messaging rather than addressing long-standing grievances.

Protests surrounding the Baloch Raaji Muchi national gathering in July 2024, and a sit-in in Gwadar led by Dr Mahrang Baloch, ended with security forces opening fire, killing several people.

Dr Mahrang Baloch was detained in March 2025 under public order laws and now faces dozens of cases, with new charges reportedly filed as she secures bail in earlier cases.

Analysts say a series of developments between 2018 and 2025 helped turn what had been a low-level insurgency into a far more organised and deadly conflict. Despite this, critics argue that the Pakistani authorities continue to underestimate the scale of the insurgency. In August 2024, the country’s interior minister, Mohsin Naqvi, drew attention for remarks suggesting that Baloch armed groups could be easily dealt with by a Station House Officer (SHO), which were widely seen as downplaying the seriousness of the situation.

Analysts say Mahrang Baloch’s imprisonment has sharply increased anger and frustration among youth who believe peaceful struggle is no longer an option. Her arrest has contributed to rising recruitment into armed groups, including among women, as seen in the latest clashes.

Why did the BLA choose this moment for Herof II?

Observers believe the timing of the operation was carefully calculated.

With major protests and instability drawing global attention in neighbouring Iran, militants in Balochistan may be seeking to highlight that a violent resistance is also unfolding next door in Pakistan.

As peaceful protests in Balochistan have increasingly been criminalised, with demonstrators frequently detained under public order laws, the BLA appears to be projecting strength through armed action.

Given Balochistan’s long border with Iran, analysts say the proximity of large-scale violence to a region already under international focus is likely intended to attract attention from global audiences, including in the Middle East, the United States, and far beyond.

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The announcement dated 22 October 2025, available on Federal Public Service Commission (FPSC) website, lists ten armed forces officers recommended for various groups under the CSS Competitive Examination 2024. Captain Syed Abdul Rehman Bin Qasim, from Pakistan army, has been assigned to the Pakistan Administrative Service (PAS) under the Punjab quota.

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As per the notification, five officers have been allocated to the Pakistan Administrative Service (PAS), three to the Police Service of Pakistan (PSP), and two to the Foreign Service of Pakistan (FSP).

Among those selected, Captain Yasir Hameed and Captain Zohaib Nasir will join the Foreign Service, while Captains Hamza Tahir Shah, Imtiaz Hussain, and Muhammad Bilal Khan Wazir have been placed in the Police Service.

Captains Syed Abdur Rehman Bin Qasim and Syed Muhammad Umar Shah, together with Flight Lieutenant Talha Hasib of the Pakistan Air Force and Lieutenants Muhammad Arsalan Shakeel and Muhammad Ali Hamad of the Pakistan Navy, have been inducted into the Pakistan Administrative Service.

Who Is Captain Syed Abdul Rehman Bin Qasim?

The family tree certificate available with Native Voices, checked and verified, shows that Capt. Syed Abdul Rehman, born in January 1999, is the son of Syed Qasim Munir, Field Marshal Asim Munir’s brother. Syed Asim Munir’s father, Syed Sarwar Munir, and his wife, Syeda Rafia Sultana, have five children. Among them are Syed Qasim Munir, Syed Hashim Munir, Syed Asim Munir, Uzma Shah Ali, and Azra Tabassam. Captain Syed Abdul Rehman is the son of Syed Qasim Munir.

Other successful candidates include officers from the Pakistan Army, Navy, and Air Force. The list is led by Flight Lieutenant Talha Hasib of the Pakistan Air Force, who secured the top position and was also allocated to the PAS.

The FPSC stated that “due care has been taken to ensure accuracy and correctness,” while reserving the right to rectify any errors or omissions.

Growing Military Presence in Civil Administration

In recent years, Pakistan has witnessed a growing trend of military officers being inducted into the civil bureaucracy and appointed to senior government positions. Major General (Retd.) Hafeez ur Rehman, Chairman of the Pakistan Telecommunication Authority (PTA), and Lieutenant General (Retd.) Nazir Ahmed, Chairman of the National Accountability Bureau (NAB), are among several retired officers currently holding key posts. Additionally, numerous serving and former military generals occupy leadership roles across various government departments.

In Balochistan, several districts are presently headed by former military personnel serving as Deputy Commissioners, Assistant Commissioners, and senior police officers, reflecting the expanding role of the armed forces in Pakistan’s civilian governance structure

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Journalists and activists have raised concerns that the exemption for the Sibi division could be intended to facilitate the recruitment of individuals from Mr Bugti’s own clan and allies into Levies positions before the force is eventually merged.

Baloch journalist Kiyya Baloch on X described the move as “technical corruption”, pointing to job advertisements for hundreds of Levies vacancies in Dera Bugti, the chief minister’s native district, posted just before other divisions’ Levies were absorbed into the police.

Official documents shared online show that 430 posts for sepoys (constables), 15 drivers, one runner, and one watchguard were advertised for Dera Bugti in December 2024, an unprecedented number for a district with a population of just over 350,000.

“If you look at the timing of the announcement for these vacancies, it is significant,” Baloch told the Native Voices.

“This announcement’s timing is important because it happened while the Levies-police merger was being discussed. In January 2025, the Balochistan government merged Levies from Quetta, Gwadar, and Lasbela into the provincial police. Mr Bugti knew the merger was coming, so he announced many Levies vacancies in Dera Bugti shortly before.”

In March, 40 more Levies vacancies in grades 14, 12, and 11 were advertised. Kiyya Baloch said interviews finished in April, but appointment orders have not been issued yet.

A government official, who requested anonymity, claimed the merger delay in Sibi was to recruit 400–500 people from Mr Bugti’s clans. Native Voices could not independently verify this claim.

“Levies have merged in Quetta, Makran, Zhob, Kalat, Rakhshan, and Nasirabad but not in Sibi. Why?” asked the official. This exception has caused a political storm in Quetta and on social media, with calls for explanation from journalists and activists.

The Balochistan government says that the process is transparent.

Reacting to Baloch’s post, former government spokesperson Shahid Rind, whose own appointment was previously declared illegal by the Balochistan High Court but who is still reported to be working unofficially, initially dismissed the allegations as a “conspiracy theory” in a tweet he later deleted. In a subsequent post in English on X, Mr Rind did not address the substance of the claims, instead writing: “The issue is that sitting in Norway and, without proper knowledge, creating a table story based on a notification with conspiracy theories is very easy.”

Critics, however, say that the timing of the recruitments and the Sibi exception raise serious questions about the transparency and fairness of the process. They point to previous episodes of politically sensitive appointments in Dera Bugti and call for all high-level Levies positions to be filled through competitive examinations administered by an independent commission.

Civil society groups are now demanding the publication of official advertisements, applicant lists, and interview schedules for the recent Levies recruitment drives. They also question why a large number of advertised posts remain unfilled despite interviews being conducted in April.