The rise of Islamic State in Balochistan is not just a problem for Pakistan, but a regional crisis that demands immediate attention. From Tehran to Beijing, Kabul to Moscow, the alarm bells are ringing. Islamabad’s strategic ambiguity is not a luxury it can afford, as it risks severe consequences both strategically and economically.
The Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP)’s footprint in Pakistan is widening, and so is the fallout. With a declared war against Baloch nationalists, a record of attacking Chinese nationals, and deepening sectarian aims against Iran, ISKP has evolved into a threat not only to Pakistan’s internal stability but to regional powers with conflicting interests and shared vulnerabilities.
For years, groups like Jundullah and Jaish al-Adl represented a manageable, if aggravating, security challenge between Pakistan and Iran. But ISKP’s virulently anti-Shia, transnational vision makes it a red line for Tehran, one that, if crossed, will invite retaliation from Tehran. The group’s Persian-language propaganda and clear threats against Iranian clerics have not gone unnoticed. Iran will not hesitate to act unilaterally if it perceives Pakistan is unable or unwilling to rein in ISKP’s Balochistan-based cells.
China, too, sees ISKP as a uniquely dangerous actor. Unlike the Afghan Taliban or other Islamist movements that China has engaged diplomatically, ISKP is ideologically committed to attacking Chinese interests. It has already targeted Chinese nationals in Balochistan’s Mastung. Worse, ISKP includes Uyghur militants from Xinjiang radicalized by Beijing’s repression of Muslims in the region and now exporting jihad against China’s infrastructure projects under the Belt and Road Initiative. Other Islamists might be tolerable in Beijing. ISKP is not.
However, the threat doesn’t end with Iran and China. ISKP’s expansion poses direct risks to Afghanistan’s fragile security, to Russian interests in the region, and the secular governments of Central Asia. The group has conducted attacks in Kabul, killed Russian nationals in March 2024 in Crocus City, Krasnogorsk, Moscow Oblast, Russia, and issued threats against former Soviet states and Turkey. Its ideology does not stop at the Durand Line. It seeks to redraw the entire influence map in Central and South Asia.
For Pakistan, any calculation that tolerating ISKP could balance or weaken Baloch nationalist movements is dangerously short-sighted. This group does not distinguish between “good” and “bad” militants. It has no regard for borders, and its threats against peaceful political voices like Mahrang Baloch and Manzoor Pashteen reveal an agenda that undermines every form of dissent, violent or not.
If Islamabad is perceived as complicit or passive in the face of ISKP’s rise, the repercussions will be strategic and severe. Iran could respond with military action, China could reconsider its investments, and Turkey, Russia and Central Asian states may start seeing Pakistan as an exporter of instability.
Afghanistan has already expressed such concerns. Moreover, international sympathy may shift towards Baloch nationalists, who are increasingly targeted by the state and now face threats from ISKP, blurring the line between counterterrorism and political repression. If Islamabad is perceived as complicit or passive in the face of ISKP’s rise, the repercussions will be strategic and severe. Iran could respond with military action, China could reconsider its investments, and Russia and Central Asian states may start seeing Pakistan as an exporter of instability.
Pakistan is at a critical juncture. The current policy of ambiguity, where some militants are nurtured while others are suppressed, is a recipe for disaster in a region where ideological extremists like ISKP cannot be confined to one province or one narrative. The time for action is now. Either contain ISKP or risk isolation in a region where even your closest partners no longer trust you.
